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EDITORIAL 
WAR BETWEEN RELIGIONS 
The Cold War Between Religions 
It is ironic as well as tragic that after the liberation from decades of persecution under 
Communism that affected all churches, that the new freedom be misused for escalation of 
tensions and conflict between many of the churches. The reasons are many: 
1. Ecumenism under the Communist control was monitored and manipulated by the 
government. In many instances ecumenism did not go beyond pleasantries and protocol. Few 
genuine theological and institutional interfaith dialogues were possible. Councils of churches 
and church mergers were brought about by government decrees. Entire churches were 
dissolved because of political reasons. Hierarchical authoritarianism was promoted by the 
government in order to simplify supervision. Some churches and church leaders perceived 
international ecumenical contacts as favoring those domestic church leaders who agreed to 
cooperate with the government. International ecumenical leaders were often insufficiently 
aware that there was a perception of being manipulated by the Soviet and Eastern European 
government propaganda. Bishop Laszlo Tokes of the Hungarian Reformed Church in 
Romania criticized the World Council of Churches for its timidity (see OPREE Vol. 10, No. 
5, pp. 29-32) and so did Jakub Trojan, Dean of the Protestant Theological Faculty of Charles 
University in Prague. Others, for similar reasons feel that there is a need for distance 
between the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy which was considered to be manipulated 
by the Communits government and the Evangelical-Baptist Church. The new president of 
the Evangelical-Baptist Church, Rev. Hrihoriy Kommendant, stated informally at a meeting 
of the National Council of Churches at Stony Point, New York on February 27, 1992, that 
it may take twenty years of distancing before they can re-commence ecumenical relations. 
In jest, he added that if it took the American churches two hundred years before they 
entered the ecumenical stage, we should understand why it will take Russians at least a 
century to do so. 
2. Now that the churches have freedom to decide their own course, a number of the 
church leaders and members have repudiated ecumenism. Many church leaders and lay 
people raised the question of whether they wanted to continue ecumenical cooperation both 
at home and abroad. The new freedom allows the churches to regain many of their lost 
properties and to rebuild their structures, some after many years of legal prohibition, which 
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brings a natural preoccupation with institutional rebuilding that leaves little time and 
predisposition to deal with interfaith matters. 
3. In a number of churches and religious organizations, new leaders were elected either 
as replacement of deceased leaders or as a protest against collaborationist policies. The newly 
elected leaders often come from among those clergy who were marginalized and persecuted 
by the Communist governments. Some of them were exiled to remote villages; others spent 
years in prison; many were denied the right to exercise their clerical offices. They are 
perceived by their flock as untainted persons of integrity. That, obviously, is the most 
important characteristic for the new leadership. But there is a concomitant feature of 
parochialism that emerged out of their marginalization and suffering. They neither know 
the other church leaders nor do they trust them. They are more likely to harbor some of the 
traditional attitudes toward other religions as rivals and threats. 
4. The most serious reason for the tensions and in some instances demise of ecumenism 
is the nationalist conflicts that are now dominating the scene in the states of the former 
USSR and Yugoslavia and the countries of Romania and Czechoslovakia. In fact, there is no 
Eastern European country which is not experiencing internal or external national conflict. 
Since religious and ethnic identity are so closely related, the national conflicts simultaneously 
bring about religious conflict. Religious leaders have been more able to take advantage of 
the opportunity to stress such identification than to consider those who belong to another 
nation or religion in a sisterly or brotherly manner. There is a distinct lack of courage in 
proclaiming that the enemy has the same God-given dignity and needs to be loved as one's 
own. A Hungarian church leader admitted to the author that had he declared in his churches 
that God equally cares for Romanians as for Hungarians he would he immediately lost his 
credibility. The lesson of forgiveness and caring has been lost amidst the unleashed 
invectives and hatreds; "God and country" seems again to be the rampant ideology. 
5. The Ukraine has been rocked by sometimes violent clashes between the Orthodox and 
Ukrainian Catholic adherents. Questions of history, legal recognition, property, and 
membership issues have reached such bitterness that it has affected Orthodox-Catholic 
relationship in general and has cooled it down to its lowest level since Vatican II. The 
Orthodox leaders not only in Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia but also in Romania interpret 
the lively interest of the Catholic Church in events in Eastern Europe as signs of Catholic 
designs upon their territories. In Romania, the Eastern Rite church is unreconciling in its 
attitude not only toward the Orthodox but also toward the Latin Rite Catholics.1 The Synod 
of European Catholic Bishops of November 28-December 4, 1991, on the theme of the re­
evangelization of Europe was interpreted by many Orthodox as a rally to proselytize among 
1"Starre Haltung der unierten Kirche," Glaube in der 2. Welt Vol 20, No. I (January 1992), p. 10. 
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the Orthodox.2 The Russian Orthodox are particularly baffled by what seems to them an 
invasion of Catholic and Protestant proselytizers who sometimes show little regard for the 
local culture and historical religions. Most of this has been done without ecumenical 
consultations. 
6. Still another conflict is an inter-Orthodox controversy between the Serbian Orthodox 
Church and Macedonian Orthodox Church as well as strife whether the Orthodox Church in 
Montenegro should remain under the Patriarchate of Belgrade or seek an autonomous 
Montenegrin Orthodox Church. The existence of a Macedonian Orthodox Church is not 
particularly welcomed either by the Bulgarian or the Greek Orthodox Church as Macedonians 
harbor aspirations toward a greater Macedonian that would encompass parts of Greece and 
Bulgaria while these two countries both claim Macedonia is theirs. 
The Hot War Between Religions 
Cold war is preferable to a shooting war. In the shortest of times, the cold war between 
some religions erupted into a hot one. It is true that these are not classical religious wars 
where religion is the major or one of the major causes, nevertheless religion plays and 
important role in these wars. Here ancient national feuds, territorial disputes, suppressed 
national aspirations due to Communist controls, and the lack of moderating civil institutions 
(e.g. no tradition of independent peace movements or pacifism) are in the foreground of the 
conflicts. But religion appears to gladly play a second fiddle to exaggerated national claims 
by stressing the victim role from which the religio-national unit now seeks to emerge. To 
point to the most apparent ones: 
I .  The Armenian-Azeri war. The Armenian-Azeri clashes are ancient; they took place 
twice in the twentieth century, in 1 905 and 1 9 1 8. After brief independence of both states, 
the Soviet government gained control of the territory, suppressed national clashes, and 
decided that the Nagorno-Karabakh area populated by an Armenian majority is to be an 
autonomous region administered by Azerbeijan. The two nationalities lived in relative 
harmony until the Great Transformation upon which bloodshed was resumed. Its worst 
outbreaks came after the two states gained complete independence and climaxed in early 
March 1 992 when hundreds, if not thousands, have been killed in territorial clashes in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians, who generally have the sympathy of the West as well as 
significant numbers in the diaspora on account of their suffering in the 1 9 1 5/ 1 9 1 6  massacres 
in Turkey, seem to have inflicted heavy damages on the Azeri population that is now 
·· . .  
2For a thoughtful American Roman Catholic reflection on this issue see Rembert G. Weakland, 
O.S.B. [Archbishop of Milwaukee], "Crisis in Orthodox-Catholic Relations: Challenges and Hopes," 
America Vol. 1 66, No. 2 (January 1 8-25, 1 992) ,  pp. 30-35. 
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responding with blinding furry. To quote Rustam Gadzhiev, the leader of the Popular Front 
of Azerbeijan: "A week ago, I could have forgiven the Armenians. But now, after handling 
the mutilated corpses of children, I cannot forgive. I consider myself a peaceful man, but 
after what I have seen, I will kill Armenian children. I will kill any Armenian, no matter 
what age. I could do it simply. Life has forced us to do this."3 Surely, there are those on 
the Armenian side who would repeat such a statement but direct it against the Azeris. The 
Muslim and Christian religious leadership of the two groups have not intervened forcefully 
to mediate the conflict. More likely, they are lobbying among their co-religionists elsewhere 
in the world to gain support and sympathy for the cause of their people. 
2. The conflicts in Georgia and Moldavia. Violence. although not on a massive scale has 
erupted in these two states as well. In Georgia the conflict has intra-Georgian political 
dimensions, but it also has a Christian-Muslim facet as Christian Georgians fight Muslim 
minorities. In Moldavia it is the Romanians versus Ukrainians and Russians, and while 
there is generally no denominational difference, the Romanian Orthodox Church gives 
enthusiastic support to the annexation of the Romanian parts of Moldavia to Romania while 
the Russian and Ukrainian churches oppose such aspirations. 
3. The civil war in Yugoslavia or former Yugoslavia. The main military activities are 
taking place in Croatia which has declared independence on June 25, 1 99 1  (along with 
Slovenia). The major war is between the predominantly Roman Catholic Croats and 
predominantly Orthodox Serbs. This is complicated by the military activities of the Yugoslav 
Army which has in the meantime become for all practical purposes a Serbian Army, with the 
unregulated military escapades of Serbian and Croatian irregulars (chetniks and ustashes 
respectively)--space constrictions do not allow a more detailed and nuanced presentation of 
the multiplicity of combatants. Some of .the combatants interpret the conflict, whether out 
of conviction or out of malice, as a religious war between Roman Catholicism and Serbian 
Orthodoxy. It is not surprising that religious buildings of both these churches seem to be a 
particularly desirable target for the other side (The Roman Catholic Church claims 1 20 
destroyed religious objects by the end of November 1991 ;  one may assume that nearly as 
many Orthodox religious buildings ended up as casualties as well). There have been a few 
meetings and calls for peace and reconciliation between the leaders of the two churches, but 
somehow they are general. The leaders of neither church has called the opposite side their 
Christian sisters and brothers; such terms are reserved for one's own flock. Since the war has 
now lasted for months there have been chances for theological reflections. Thus, Dr. Drago 
, 
Simundza, editor of the Catholic Crkva u svijetu [Church in the World] recognizes the right 
3Fen Montaigne, "Azeri-Armenia conflict takes a deadly new turn," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
March 8, 1 992. 
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of Croatian Catholics for self-defense and self-determination but urges restraint and only 
morally defensible use of force,4 yet no overt call for reconciliation can be found. On the 
whole, church leaders of both churches have been very busy appealing for assistance and 
support from abroad, claiming that genocide is being carried out over their own membership 
but showing no criticism of the behavior of their own national forces. 
4. Another major conflict on the Balkans is between Serbian Orthodox and Muslims. 
This conflict is two-pronged. One is the conflict between Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo, 
the Albanians being overwhelmingly Muslim with a Catholic minority, and the other is 
between Serbians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Muslim who make the largest 
group of the population in that republic. The Kosovo Albanians have sought autonomy or 
status of a republic while a referendum in Bosnia, which was boycotted by the Serbs yielded 
a majority opting for independence. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, 
threatened that such a move means the end of Islam in Yugoslavia, a not-very-veiled threat 
of genocide of about 3-4 million people. There is an attempt to somehow bring the Muslim, 
Orthodox, and Catholic clergy in Bosnia together by a joint publication, Zajednistvo 
[Togetherness] and a bi-annual book fair in Sarajevo at which time an inter-faith dialogue 
would take place, but all of this may come to naught if the outburst of violence after the 
referendum in early March 1992 is followed up by additional bloodshed. 
What Can Religious People in the West Do to Help Ecumenism in the East? 
Nothing can be done from the outside to determine the course of ecumenism in any 
particular locale, but one can aid and support certain trends toward cooperation and dialogue. 
The first and foremost would be to give an uplifting witness by our own ecumenical 
cooperation and dialogue. · 
The second would be to avoid behaving in Eastern Europe as if it was a terra incognita. 
Religious aid and presence in Eastern Europe should be implemented by some degree of 
consultation, notification, and wherever possible cooperation. Western humanitarian aid can 
provide the context in which religious people of the East may meet without constraint and 
may develop new contacts that can serve in the future as training ground for the new, non­
manipulated ecumenism. 
The third would be for the more evangelistic religious groups, old and new religions 
alike, to show respect and concern for other religions that operated in these countries for 
centuries. It is true that religious leaders in the East will have to learn that religious freedom 
4Drago Simundza, "Bezumnost osvajackog rata i borba za mir u Hrvatskoj 1 99 1 "  [The lunacy of 
the war of subjugation and the struggle for peace in Croatia 1 99 1 ], Crkva u Svijetu Vol. 24, No. 4 
( 1 99 1 ), pp. 225-229. 
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means that, indeed, any religious group has the right to function on any territory. True 
religious freedom brings religious pluralism and especially unchurched population may be 
rightfully contacted and invited, but without coercion or deceit. Such groups should, 
however, be especially thoughtful of the suffering and victimization produced by 
Communism and should not exploit this situation by show of glitter, finances, and 
manipulation. It would probably be desirable to organize mission consultations in the West 
with participation of both ecumenical and evangelistic mission agencies and persons on how 
to proceed thoughtfully to evangelize in an area where historically religion was strong but 
where Communism created a vast ignorance of religion and a decline in religious practice. 
The established churches in the East may well ask themselves whether people are better off 
not to be reached by their own religious efforts or being converted to another religious 
institution. 
Fourthly, time will help. The Great Transformation happened all too recently, and it 
unavoidably brings disorientation, confusion, and even chaos. As time passes, many things 
will be sorted out, and the various players will gain strength and confidence and will cease 
to be as threatened by rivalries as they are now. If ecumenism and interreligious dialogue 
really has something abiding to offer in the history of religions, then it will do it despite 
regional set-backs. Just as it is likely that many Eastern Europeans will catch up in 
technology, they will also catch up in ecumenism, leaving behind the cold and hot religious 
wars of the current scene. 
Lastly, ecumenically oriented religious groups must do everything they can to stay neutral 
if they wish to be reconcilers in these local turmoils. It will not do for the Vatican to only 
show support and provide relief for the Catholics in Croatia and the World Couincil of 
Churches only to visit the churches that are members of the WCC, namely the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and some of the Protestant Churches, as they have done so far. Christians 
of the West should also show concern for the well-being of Muslims and not only for fellow­
Christians. The exaggerated rhetoric of the danger of Islamic fundamentalism on part some 
Eastern Europeans needs to be countered by reason and moderation of Christians and 
Muslims from outside the area. Both relief and contacts must be balanced if we are to be 
successful peace-makers. Peace-making was a high priority for many of us during the Cold 
War between the two blocs. It should continue as a high priority in the new situation of 
numerous cold and hot religious and national wars in Eastern Europe and the independent 
states of the former Soviet Union. 
Paul Mojzes, editor 
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